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Richard Buel Jr., In Irons: Britain $ Naval Supremacy and the American 
Revolutionavy Economy (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998). 
This book not only addresses the much neglected subject of the economy of the 
United States between 1775 and 1783 but offers a challenging reappraisal of the 
American Revolutionary War. Richard Buel Jr. contends that the economy of the 
war years is inadequately studied because of the lack of data series so beloved by 
economic historians. He dramatically reconstructs the war economy with farm 
ledgers and merchant accounts to show that there was an initial "collapse of the 
agricultural sector" which threatened the patriots with defeat because "agriculture 
held the key to the outcome of the war." (xi) Valley Forge (1777) was just the first 
of four winters of scarcity which culminated in the mutinies in the continental army 
of January 178 1. The worst years were 1778-79. Buel differs from the standard 
accounts by finding that the sufferings of the army and the depreciation of the 
continental currency were not due so much to the Continental Congress but to a 
decline in grain production in the mid-Atlantic states, "the principal grain region 
of the infant republic," which fell to "no more than a twentieth of its prewar 
surplus." (29) 
Buel attributes the food shortages to the successful blockade of North 
America by the British navy between 1775 and 1781. He dismisses the traditional 
explanation that agricultural production declined because of labour shortages 
induced by demands of the army: the adult male population was far from being 
hlly mobilized whlle the size of the potential labour force increased during the 
war. Not only were exports and imports severely impeded by the naval blockade 
but every major port was captured by the British at some stage of the American 
War. This was highly significant, although it is a point undeveloped elsewhere, 
since the ports we& key arteries in the export led economy of colonial America. 
The impact of conquest often devastated the hinterlands around the ports as 
happened after the British conquest of Philadelphia in 1778. The continental navy 
and the state navies were unable to mount effective resistance, for reasons the 
author discusses at length, while their strength declined after 1779. The shortages 
caused by the British naval blockade and the capture of major ports were 
compounded by enemy privateers, the demands of the French allies, the difficulty 
of dealing with French merchants who lacked the credit of their English 
counterparts and the inept attempts of a desperate government to control the 
revolutionary economy. 
Fortunately, agricultural production began to revive in 1780 which "laid the 
basis for a limited economic recovery in the following year that was to provide a 
necessary precondition for the victory at Yorktown." (1 85) Buel contends that this 
was partially a consequence of the states and the continental govemment 
abandoning price fixing, legal tender laws and embargoes in favor of "more liberal 
approaches" to the market place. (147) He credits in particular Robert Morris, as 
superintendent of finance, with "a vision of a market-oriented war economy that 
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would recirculate money raised fiom taxation and reestablish public credit through 
an impost." (235) He therefore dissents from John E. Crowley's The Privileges of 
Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (1993) which views 
Robert Morris as a neomercantilist. The economic revival was also assisted by the 
amval of the French army who bought specie and by the rise of direct trade with 
France. The naval blockade off Newport and Rhode Island began to relax owing to 
the damage sustained by British navy during the humcane of 1780 and the 
relocation of war ships. This set the stage for the crucial resurgence of the economy 
of the mid-Atlantic region especially around Philadelphia whose revival was also 
helped by the virtual elimination of competition from Baltimore, where British 
military efforts began to concentrate and fiom St. Eustatius which was conquered 
by the British in January 1781. Trade increased with the Caribbean, most notably 
with Cuba, and farmers planted more crops in expectation of hard currency 
payments. 
In Irons represents a major contribution to the history of the American 
Revolutionary War. It successfiilly integrates the economic, social and military 
aspects of the war in a compelling account. It challenges the view that the 
sufferings of the continental army were due to a republican ideology suspicious of 
standing annies advanced by Charles Royster's A Revolutionary People at War: The 
Continental Army and American Chamcteu, 1775-1 783 (1 979). It shuns the often 
parochial accounts of the domestic front by introducing the larger context of 
Europe and the Caribbean. It gives particular emphasis to the importance of trade 
with the Caribbean relative to Europe. Indeed, this dimension might usefidly be 
expanded. The British abandonment of Philadelphia was not, as the author claims, 
simply to retrench in New York but to free troops for the conquest of St. Lucia 
whch was the gateway to the French naval headquarters at Martinique. 
The claim that the British naval blockade was effective contradicts the views 
of American naval historians like David Syrett in The Royal Navy in American 
Waters 1775-1 783 (1 989). Similarly, John A. Tilley wrote of the poor quality and 
bickering of the admirals who commanded the North American station in fie 
British Navy and the American Revolution (1987). He concludes that their mission 
was a failure. Unfortunately, Buel does not provide much evidence of the British 
naval blockade itself but rather asserts its role in the collapse of the trade and 
agricultural production. Nevertheless, his argument does reinforce the recent work 
of British naval historians like Daniel Baugh and Nicholas Rodger who have 
respectively questioned the traditional belief that Britain lost naval supremacy 
during the last five years of the war and that the navy was badly administered by 
Lord Sandwich. The British navy did after all defeat the French navy in the Battle 
of the Saints (1 782) but the new government of Lord Shelbume was determined to 
sign a peace with the United States. 
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